

OPERATIONAL ART IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Richard M. Cabrey
Field Artillery**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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
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
Major Richard M. Cabrey

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Approved by:



LTC(P) Christopher L. Baggott, MA, MMAS Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree
Program

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ABSTRACT

Operational Art In Operations Other Than War by MAJ Richard M. Cabrey, USA, 46 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War the United States Army has found itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Additionally, our National Security Strategy states that these operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. As these operations usually entail diverse tactical actions directed towards achieving strategic objectives, the operational commander is forced to conduct this linkage with joint and multinational forces. The operational commander may also be forced to operate within less than desirable command structures often dictated by the United Nations or other multinational agencies.

The focus of this study is on the potential challenges the operational or joint force commander might face when directing military actions in MOOTW. The U.S. involvement and contemporary definitions of MOOTW establishes the background for the case study of the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. A discussion of the evolution and concept of operational art provides the framework to analyze the UNSOM II operation with respect to the eight elements of operational art identified by Dr. James Schneider.

Finally, the study concludes that the U.S. military demonstrated operational art with some shortfalls. In the areas of command and control, unity of command, and operational vision, decisions made at the strategic level often impact negatively on the operational commander's ability to link the tactical actions to strategic objectives. Additionally, although Dr. Schneider defines his theory of operational art within the context of total war, his theory can be functionally applied to MOOTW as well.

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INTRODUCTION

Military operations other than war (MOOTW), and specifically stability operations have become the predominant contemporary mission for U.S. military forces. With the collapse of the Soviet Union army units are finding themselves involved in more peacekeeping operations than any other possible mission since the completion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Recent MOOTW operations include: Somalia, Haiti, Northern and Southern Iraq, the Sinai, Macedonian and Bosnia. The size and complexity of these deployments have demonstrated a clear commitment by our nation's leaders to utilize the armed forces in conjunction with other instruments of national power. *The National Security Strategy For A New Century* specifically states that the military must be able to respond to the full spectrum of crises that may arise.¹

The U.S. military builds, maintains and trains forces to deal with the possibility of operations at the extreme end of the continuum of conflict. However, since 1989 the majority of operations fall under the category of OOTW. With these types of operations our military forces are encountering a threat in which the use of overwhelming combat power may not be the appropriate answer to a crisis region. U.S. forces are finding themselves facing potential enemies or belligerents that constitute an asymmetrical threat. The asymmetrical threat constitutes an enemy or force with little or no resemblance to U.S. force structure and is likely not arrayed in depth. The Vietcong presented an asymmetrical threat to the U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. This type of threat will

potentially preclude the use of so called “operational art” to link strategic goals with tactical operations.

Dr. James Schneider, from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Program, and other Soviet military theorist of the interwar years assume that the threat that would enable the use of operational art would be a more symmetrical threat. In order to defeat potential asymmetrical threats, overwhelming combat power is usually not the goal of our military forces. Accordingly, the involvement of U.S. forces in MOOTW tend to be viewed as operations where the military instrument of power is subordinated to other power tools such as diplomacy or economics.

In these cases involving peace operations, there is, to a large extent, tactical operations loosely tied to strategic objectives. It is this linkage between military tactics and strategic goals that suffer from the difficulty of applying a more analytical framework for traditional operational art.

The dilemma that U.S. military leaders face is the strategic impact of small tactical actions on regional strategic goals. Success in MOOTW is predicated on military actions closely tied to the diplomatic, economic and informational tools available to our policy makers in order to ensure unity of effort in achieving a desired end state.

Problem Background and Significance

The focus of this study is on the potential challenges the operational or joint force commander might face when directing military action in MOOTW. According to Joint doctrine, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) employs “operational art” in conjunction

with strategic guidance and direction received from higher leaders in developing campaigns and operations.² Nested in the development of campaigns is the distribution of military actions in space and time. The orchestration of these distributed military operations through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of a military campaign to link separate tactical actions to achieve a strategic goal is operational art.³

Dr. Schneider, defines a framework for operational art consisting of eight key characteristics. This theoretical framework provides a reference to analyze past operations as well as to view potential future operations. This monograph will look at a recent case study involving U.S. forces conducting stability operations in Somalia. The 1992-1993 Somalia military operation provides an example of an asymmetrical threat or belligerent in an environment where the level of conflict proceeded to escalate the peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to a peace enforcement mission with significant armed conflict for the U.S. and U.N. forces involved. This case study will determine which elements of operational art were or were not appropriately applied to achieve a desired end state . The monograph will analyze the case study with respect to an accepted model for operational art to answer the primary research question. Did the U.S. military conduct operational art in the MOOTW environment of Somalia?

Following the introduction, the second chapter will include a discussion on MOOTW. This section will be a comprehensive discussion of what constitutes MOOTW from joint and military service perspectives. The focus will be a discussion of those operations that normally involve aspects of combat operations within the spectrum of conflict, primarily those operations that involve peacekeeping and peace making.

Because humanitarian assistance was the initial reason for deploying forces to Somalia, this type of operation will also be addressed.

The next chapter of this monograph will provide an overview of the contemporary definition of operational art. This will include a detailed discussion on the development of operational art and the components that define it. Dr. Schneider, in his essay "The Vulcan's Anvil", provides a set of eight characteristics that define operational art.⁴ These eight characteristics when viewed with the current Joint framework for operational art found in Joint Publication 3-0, "*Doctrine for Joint Operations*" show the suitability in using Dr. Schneider's model for analyzing the case study.

The historical case study chapter will look at the Somalia operation. From an operational perspective, those elements that constitute operational art as defined earlier in the monograph will be brought out. Each of Dr. Schneider's fundamentals of operational art will be identified as they apply to the Somalia operation.

The analysis section of the monograph will assess the case study with regard to the primary research question. The criteria used for analysis: Did the U.S. military conduct operations within the framework described by Dr. Schneider. The analysis portion will provide a summary of the elements of operational art as they applied to Somalia

This study concludes that the U.S. military operated within the framework of operational art established by Dr. Schneider. The perceived failure of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II as an operation was not necessarily the result of poor tactics or a reflection of the commander's abilities. Unity of effort, command and control, and operational vision are the major elements that suffered due to strategic

decisions. Shortfalls in these three areas influenced actions within all the elements of operational art as defined by Dr. Schneider. Analysis of the UNOSOM II operation may show that a true Joint Task Force (JTF) structure, as established for UNOSOM I, UNITAF and the tail end of UNOSOM II would alleviate the same potential shortfalls in future MOOTW.

Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. The use of these capabilities is usually in conjunction with and normally subordinate to the other instruments of national power.⁵ Within this range of military operations forces may conduct humanitarian assistance missions as one extreme and peacemaking or peace enforcement operations as the other extreme. These operations differ significantly from "traditional" military missions in a number of fundamental ways, including: 1) the compression of strategic, operational, and tactical decisions and processes; 2) the apparent ad hoc nature of command, force, and sustainment arrangements; 3) the lack of unity of command or even purpose; and 4) the addition of a civil-military dimension.⁶ It is possible to visualize these operations occurring along a spectrum of conflict.

States of the Environment	Goal	Military Operations		Examples
War	Fight and Win	War	C O M B A T	Large Scale Combat operations Attack Defend
Conflict	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	Other Than War	N O N C O M B A T	Strikes and raids Peace enforcement Support to Insurgency Antiterrorism Peacekeeping NEO
Peacetime	Promote Peace	Other Than War		Counter Drug Disaster Relief Civil Support Peace Building Nation Assistance
The states of peacetime, conflict and war could all exist all at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.				

Figure 1 Range of military operations in the theater strategic environment

Figure one provides examples of the varying types of operations within the states of the strategic environment. These range from humanitarian assistance entailing little or no hostile action to peace enforcement operations which may require the flexible application of combat power to prevent violence and enable peaceful negotiations. In the case of Somalia, the missions encountered placed participants in multiple operational states simultaneously. Forces routinely found themselves operating in an environment where combat and noncombat operations occurred simultaneously.

U.S. involvement in last decade

U.S. current National Security Strategy discusses at length the possible and intended uses of our military forces. The strategy from our senior leaders clearly identify operations other than war, to include peacekeeping operations as possibly being our most frequent challenge as a military in the future.⁷ Additionally, in February 1996 the President of the United States released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 as a means to establish a framework for how and when U.S. forces would engage in peace

operations.⁸ This document gives specific guidance for the use of our military forces and also addresses the fact that we will not specifically identify units tailored only for U.N. peace operations. The capabilities of the military must still be focused on winning two major regional conflicts.⁹ Within the context of strategic objectives, joint publications provide additional guidance on conducting MOOTW. Joint Publication 3-0 is the capstone manual for conducting all joint operations states. Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.¹⁰ Joint publications further refine the doctrine for conducting MOOTW, specifically those missions occurring within the simultaneous environment of combat and non combat. Amplifying the expected and frequent use of U.S. military forces in peace operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 *"Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations"* states, "The United States is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world."¹¹ Deployments of our armed forces to the Sinai, Macedonia, Haiti, Somalia, Turkey, Northern and Southern Iraq and Bosnia since 1989 serve to confirm this expected use of our military forces as an instrument of national power to further national strategic goals and objectives.

Although MOOTW includes numerous types of operations from peace operations to humanitarian assistance and support to civil authorities, the focus of this chapter will be on identifying those operations that the U.S. military engaged in Somalia. In an

official lessons learned report, the U.S. military in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope and Continue Hope) experienced a full range of MOOTW.

In many respects, Operation RESTORE HOPE represents a first for U.S. forces in fulfilling peace enforcement and peacekeeping roles while supporting UN humanitarian assistance efforts. With the absence of a legitimate government and due to the number of warring factions, military forces were involved in every aspect of the restoration of order from limited combat operations to political negotiations and reconstruction of the national infrastructure.¹²

This statement aids in establishing that operations in Somalia contained sufficient elements of MOOTW to classify it as an operational case study. While the case study will focus on the elements of operational art in Somalia, it is not the intention of this monograph to define each of the MOOTW missions performed by U.S. forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope

Operational Art

To properly analyze the applicability of operational art in MOOTW a common framework for operational art must be established. To construct a framework the first step is to define operational art. The definition of operational art from the introduction, found in the Army Field Manual 100-5, provides a clear statement that operational art is a means of linking tactical operations to strategic goals.

The Emergence of Operational Art

The second step is to determine the origins of the concept of operational art. Dr. Schneider in his Theoretical Paper Number Four, purposes that the beginning of operational art occurred towards the end of the civil war. In April of 1863, both Hooker's Union Army and Stonewall Jackson conducted the first operational maneuver in history.¹³ Hooker and Jackson both were able to maneuver their forces from one battlefield to another. This was not merely a movement of forces on the ground but a redirection of effort and objectives through the maneuvering of forces. Other historians contend that operational art may have emerged as early as the Napoleonic warfare era. For the purposes of this monograph, Dr. Schneider's assertion of the beginning of operational art will be used as the point of departure for further discussion.

Dr. Schneider provides no single cause for the emergence, but allows for the combined effects of increased lethality in weapons, enhanced command and control systems, and the railroad to support mobilization, movement and logistics all as principle factors contributing to operational maneuver.

The Growth of Operational Art

Even before the end of World War I the Soviet Union began to realize the potential of developing operational military art. Alexander Svechin, arguably one of the preeminent fathers of Soviet Operational Art used his experiences in the Russo Japanese war to identify shortfalls in Russian military strategy. He witnessed the Japanese combining ground and naval efforts towards a common aim while his own Russian army

ignored the idea of a unified vision to direct military action.¹⁴ By the end of World War I and the Russian Revolution in 1918, Svechin focused all of his energies on combining historical facts and theory to develop the new found requirement of modern warfare, that of linking tactical to strategic. It was during 1923-24 during a series of lectures that Svechin first introduced the term "Operational Art" and defined it as the sum of maneuvers and battles in a given theater directed at achieving a common goal, identified as the objective for the period of the campaign.¹⁵

It should be understood from the Russian viewpoint that the discovery of operational art was not the end to the means but a result of an attempt by the military leaders of the nation in determining the ultimate military strategy that would best suit the needs of the nation. During this search for the new military strategy several Russian officers attempted to refine the idea of operational art in achieving strategic ends. One of these officers, in debate with Svechin expounded on the concept of operational art. Mikhail Tukachevsky believed in the decisive battle, but saw that only through deep operational maneuver across the width and depth of the battle field could the destruction of the enemy be achieved. To accomplish this simultaneous action he saw the use of mechanized and airborne forces combined with class struggles in the enemy's rear area as the conditions necessary to exact the destruction of the enemy.¹⁶ This was contrary to the ideas of Svechin who believed that the enemy could be exhausted as Russia absorbed the attacker in its vast territory, with defeat of an adversary coming from the mobilization of the multitude of peasants combined with supporting arms attacks against the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. Svechin's strategy emerged as that most closely

describing the course the Soviet Union took in World War II. However, the concepts of Tukachevsky's armored, mechanized and airborne formations completed the defense and contributed significantly to the eventual destruction of the German army.

The next significant leap in the development of contemporary operational art occurred in the Soviet Union from 1953-1959. The Soviet military saw U.S. military technological advances as a catalyst to further focus their own efforts in operational art. Mobility throughout the battlefield and a focus of all arms combining speed and concentration of force at a decisive point escalated this Soviet paradigm of deep operational maneuver and further defined what we now call operational art.¹⁷ This returns us to the basic premise of Dr. Schneider in his discussion of operational art reflected in the conduct of deep operational maneuver.

The Framework

Dr. Schneider takes the components of operational art and establishes a framework upon which definitions of the components provide the tools to establish the occurrence or absence of operational art in any given military endeavor. The following list provides the elements of operational art as defined by Dr. Schneider:

(1) The Distributed Operation: Military actions comprise an integration of distributed actions extended in time and space but unified by a common aim to retain or deny freedom of action.

(2) The Distributed Campaign: Military actions focus not on a single objective but instead on several objectives within an opposing military system and ultimately achieve victory by causing the collapse of system support.

(3) Continuous Logistics: Logistical support is derived from a formal system that provides continuous support of military actions instead of from a dependence on scavenging.

(4) Instantaneous Command and Control: The command and control structure is linked together with a reliable system that allows for rapid communication.

(5) The Operationally Durable Formation: Military forces are structured with an effective balance between independence of action and battlefield survivability.

(6) Operational Vision: Military actions are focused with a common operational vision that is synergistic in nature.

(7) The Distributed Enemy: The opposing force must be generally symmetrical and arrayed in depth to preclude the opportunity for a single decisive engagement.

(8) Distributed Deployment: Military actions must be supported by continuous mobilization.¹⁸

Each of these elements will be addressed in more detail as they are applied to the historical case study.

To validate the use of Dr. Schneider's framework it must be compared to the accepted definition and components of operational art found in current U.S. military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-0 provides 14 facets of operational art. Each of these facets as they are presented in doctrine are overarching concepts that can be applied to one or more of Dr. Schneider's fundamentals. An example would be that of "synergy". This concept is described as the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) desire to combine effects of air, land, sea and special operations forces in multiple dimensions of the battlefield while ensuring a shared vision.¹⁹ This facet incorporates distributed campaign, distributed operations, operational vision, instantaneous command and control and operationally durable formations. What Dr. Schneider provides is a more objective means to view an operation by giving the analyst a definable objective term

that incorporates accepted doctrinal facets. For this reason, Dr. Schneider's framework serves as a valid and measurable means to evaluate contemporary operations in a doctrinally correct manner.

Analysis

The participation of the United States in Somalia expanded gradually from April 1992, when U.S. military forces were first introduced, until January 1995 when Operation United Shield marked the end of U.S. involvement. Throughout this period, the missions assigned to U.S. forces and the conduct of operations were guided by a series of UN resolutions. A case study of UNOSOM II, conducted between 4 May 1993 and 31 March 1994 requires a review of the resolutions and the resulting actions of U.S. forces that led to the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia.

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 751 known as United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April of 1992 to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease fire between warring Somali factions. The United States entered the scene in Somalia as a participating member of the United Nations with the U.S. military providing support for Operation Provide Relief as early as July 1992. The primary role of the U.S. military in this operation was the air transportation of food shipments for non governmental organizations (NGO) from Kenya to southern Somalia.

In August of 1992 the UN Security Council approved Resolution 775 providing an increase in the military strength of UNOSOM I to four 750-man security units for the protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. The

continuous looting and clan battles which diverted supplies from distribution centers resulted in a U.S. request to the UN for unilateral initiatives. By November 1992 the U.S. began planning for and received UN approval for a unilateral initiative which would place a U.S. division size force in Somalia under UN auspices.²⁰ The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN Security Council approved this U.S. initiative on 3 December 1992. The plan allowed participating nations the use of forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia. The new resolution (794), provided participating nations with authorization to use "all means necessary" to include military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²¹ The U.S. military, specifically the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) took the lead for the initial commitment of 24,000 UN troops under the name of United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). The exact role of the military under Resolution 794 was never clearly expressed by the Security Council. The resolution provided military planners with very little from which to develop a practical military end state. This apparent lack of definitive guidance from the UN compounded by assumed U.S. military objectives would ultimately lead to obstacles for the eventual transition to the UN controlled UNOSOM II also known as Operation Continue Hope.

UNOSOM II was officially established by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993, four months after the U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF) had begun, and less than six weeks before UNOSOM II was to take over. Both operations were authorized under Chapter VII (Peace Making) of the UN charter, allowing military forces in UNOSOM II to employ coercive force for a much broader

mandate that covered more territory.²² A comparison of the two major UN operations show the major differences in the types of missions, command and control structure and the threat.

OPERATION	DATES	MISSION	C2	THREAT
Operation RESTORE HOPE UNOSOM I	3 Dec 92 4 May 93	Secure, assist relief operations, organizations, agencies	U.S.-led United Task Force	Disorder, Lawlessness
U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II	4 May 93 31 Mar 94	Combat forces: Force protection, operations beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II forces.	Cdr, U. S. Forces, Somalia	Hostile factions

Figure 2 UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II comparison²³

Operation Restore Hope (UNOSOM I) and UNITAF made tremendous progress in accomplishing UN objectives. These two missions set the stage for the bulk of the follow-on operation, UNOSOM II. The broader mission and attempt to merge several different types of missions under a less than desirable multinational U.N. headquarters provides an opportunity to determine if operational art was or could have been applied to this operation. Using Dr. Schneider's framework, the eight elements he contends are required for operational art will be examined in relation to the UNOSOM II operation.

The Distributed Operation

The distributed operation is described as the ensemble of distributed actions extended in time and space but unified by a common aim to deny or retain freedom of action. According to Dr. Schneider this element is the basic building block of all

operational planning and execution.²⁴ Distributed actions include deep maneuvers and or battles separated by time and space with a common end state.

The aspect of deep maneuver in UNOSOM II can be demonstrated in viewing lines of communication (LOC) for the US military in the theater of operation. The depth of the theater as measured from the LOCs actually ranged from Somalia to the United States. U.S. military forces depended heavily on the maneuver of equipment and personnel from the U.S. to Somalia. Because there was no true theater logistic base established in Somalia, the term maneuver instead of movement is applied here. With ports of debarkation (POD) located immediately within the theater, personnel and equipment were basically placed directly into the operation with very little reception and staging occurring. Although the port and airfield in Mogadishu evolved into a large logistical facility, there was no true theater logistic base established to support operations in the Somali theater. The United Nations Logistics Support Command UNLSC) was an ad-hoc organization designed to support all coalition forces with the U.S. carrying a majority of the burden for sustainment and logistical support. It is not clear why a theater logistics base with general support capability was not established in theater. Certainly this would have reduced the dependence on the long lines of communication back to the United States. The dependence on logistics from the U.S. to the Somali theater expanded the theater of operations to a depth half way around the world. This continuous maneuver of equipment and personnel in and out of the theater constituted a significant aspect of the distributed operation.

Additionally, within UNOSOM II there were conventional military forces conducting peace enforcement operations, special operations forces conducting raids, and civilian organizations also conducting humanitarian assistance. Each of these separate and distinct operations were focused in pursuing the goals of "rehabilitating political institutions and the economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation" set forth in the Security Council resolution 814.²⁵ The resolution was further defined as a UN "agenda" with seven separate objectives: Economic relief and rehabilitation, national and regional institutions (local governments), police and law and order, international humanitarian law, refugees and displaced persons, the clearing of land mines, and finally public information programs to support U.N. activities.²⁶ A number of humanitarian operations centers (HOC) and civil-military operations centers (CMOC) integrated the efforts of the conventional military, special operations forces and NGOs.²⁷ The HOC was used to coordinate requests for military support from relief agencies delivering supplies to the numerous distribution points. The CMOCs provided the military liaison to the HOC and managed humanitarian relief operations (HRO) requests in the area of technical assistance, space-available flights and security.²⁸ Although there were some problems due to the nature of the overall command and control structures, the focus of the separate operations was a common one.

With the established operation centers (HOC/CMOC), the UN was able to execute their missions simultaneously. The humanitarian relief operations were expanded throughout the region, thus enhancing the freedom of action of the UN Forces while denying the Somali warlords the ability to interdict the relief efforts and escalate political

unrest in the region. This simultaneity and depth is a key facet in the conduct of operational art as defined by joint doctrine.²⁹ Within the context of the distributed operation, the next key element is the distributed campaign.

The Distributed Campaign

The distributed campaign is seen as those military actions focusing on several objectives within an opposing military system to achieve victory by causing the collapse of system support. In conventional war terms we see the linkage of separate tactical actions linked together with a common purpose to achieve operational objectives. Although the tactical actions may be dispersed and against separate targets, the overall effect is a collapse of a support system which may be either a critical vulnerability or operational center of gravity. In peace operations, the distributed campaign can be viewed as the integration of tactical military actions and separate diplomatic efforts to achieve the operational objective. A dilemma potentially occurs when military operations which may involve force pose a threat to diplomatic efforts.

In UNOSOM II several military operations eroded the overall diplomatic and military effort to attack the identified system of support. MG Arnold, the Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division, in 1993, identified the enemy system of support or center of gravity as the independent power of the Somali war lords.³⁰ By eliminating the power of the Somali warlords the UN could achieve the conditions to fully implement the agenda set forth in UN resolution 814.

Under UN Resolution 814, Major General (MG) Montgomery was made Deputy Force Commander of UN forces in Somalia. He was also "dual hatted" as the U.S. Army force commander with 8,000 logistical personnel and a light infantry brigade of 1,700 soldiers to act as a quick reaction force (QRF).³¹ MG Montgomery's logistical force was primarily tasked to conduct nation building missions to restore the Somali infrastructure while the QRF provided security for those logisticians executing that mission. As the senior U.S. commander on the ground he was also responsible for reassuring the local Somali clans of continued U.S. support for a peaceful environment.

U.S. Task Force Ranger, under the command of MG Garrison made its appearance in the Somali theater on 26 August 1993. TF Ranger was subordinate to U.S. Central Command-Joint Special Operations Command (USCENTCOM/JSOC). The mission of TF Ranger was the capture of Aidid and his senior Lieutenants. Although the raids were directed towards the support system identified by MG Arnold, they were not well integrated with the mission of the USARFOR commander. The seven separate raids conducted by TF Ranger appeared to circumvent the peaceful environment that MG Montgomery was trying to portray to the Somali clans. These supposed surgical military operations leading to increased use of firepower in the theater resulting in civilian casualties and collateral damage. The casualties and damage severely detracted from the peaceful environment MG Montgomery attempted to create. This also reduced the legitimacy of the UNOSOM II mission in the eyes of the Somali people. It appeared to the Somali people that maintaining the peace in Somalia was no longer a mission of the military forces. The violent raids focused on Aidid and his lieutenants were completely

counter to the environment MG Montgomery was attempting to foster. By virtue of the established command and control structure dictated by the United States, MG Montgomery, as the designated U.S. forces commander, had no command authority over TF Ranger but had responsibility for possible extraction support missions.³²




Figure 3 UNOSOM II C2 Structure³³

The command and control diagram in figure 3 shows the potential for problems in synchronizing efforts of the various elements. An example of these problems was clearly demonstrated in the TF Ranger mission on 3 October 1993 where U.N Forces had to aid in the rescue attempt. The command and control structure was not conducive to the rapid response by an ill-equipped QRF that had to rely on UN Coalition armored forces to accomplish the rescue.

Finally, General Hoar, (Commander in Chief USCENTCOM) was directed to reduce the amount of combat power in the Somali theater. U.S. policy makers believed that the presence of overwhelming combat power in the Somali theater detracted from creating a secure and stable environment. This pressure eventually led to the Office of the Secretary of Defense denying armored vehicles requested by MG Montgomery for his

QRF. The lack of armored forces in the QRF led to a delayed extraction by Coalition forces of TF Ranger elements during a failed operation on 3 October 1993.³⁴

It appears that there were limited operational means established to link the tactical actions of separate operations to the desired strategic end state. Not only did TF Ranger operations detract from the diplomatic efforts of a peaceful environment, there was no capability for the U.S. senior commander (MG Montgomery) to incorporate the actions of TF Ranger into his overall plan.

Continuous Logistics

The third requirement for operational art is continuous logistics. As applied to a force in the field, this is the sustainment of the force's tempo and density. This sustainment effort is measured by the flow of equipment and personnel to meet the needs of the commander. The logistic effort must allow the force to maintain the pressure on the enemy to deny him freedom of action, while enhancing the friendly force's own freedom of action.

During the UNOSOM II mission there were several logistical operations conducted to ensure sustainment of the force. The QRF force had its own direct support logistics package in the form of a forward support battalion. This element was tailored to meet specific requirements of those forces in the QRF. As the structure of the QRF evolved from a predominant ground force to an air mobile force the FSB evolved accordingly.

Additional logistical support came from a United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). The UNLSC was responsible for the sustainment of all other UN forces in theater. Although designed as a multinational effort, the U.S. provided the bulk of support for the UNLSC. The structure of these support packages shows that they were distinct and separate and not necessarily linked in overall priorities or procedures. There were no common systems to manage accountability and asset visibility for the two separate logistic operations. This led to problems with parts availability and a shortfall in the UNLSC's ability to conduct both joint and multinational support for units relying on common sustainment items³⁵. This problem was further exacerbated by the fact that sustainment units rotated personnel into theater every 4-6 months. Any workarounds that units managed to implement were lost to new personnel since there was not a centralized or controlling authority for all logistics operations.³⁶

The ability of the forces in theater to manage personnel replacements was initially adequate for the operation. Due to the relatively low force structure, each nation was able to meet the requirements for reception of their own personnel with existing sustainment packages. However, after 4 October 93, larger units began arriving in theater and overwhelmed the capability of units to conduct adequate force reception. Again the absence of a central General Supply base in theater degraded the reception operations. Units in theater had to rely on their own direct support (DS) assets to meet the needs of incoming units. Requirements for items like tents, cots, food and water placed a huge burden on the DS units that detracted from their ability to provide sustainment to their designated parent units. Although the expanded ports in Mogadishu helped to relieve

some of the supply burden, there was no organization identified to provide the necessary personnel support that would normally be established within a theater of operations.

Instantaneous Command and Control

The distributed nature of the modern battlefield challenges commanders with the problem of receiving information and passing instructions to subordinate units over extended time and space. In an OOTW environment the tactical picture can change rapidly and unexpectedly, especially when dealing with militias and civilian mobs acting independently as in Somalia. The presence of instantaneous command and control enhances the ability of the operational commander to maintain control over seemingly independent tactical actions in a distributed campaign.

When considering command and control, numerous elements are combined to enhance a commander's ability to provide guidance and receive data on the distributed battlefield. Three of these elements include radio or signal communications, liaison teams and computers. In Somalia shortfalls within each of these areas worked to undermine this key component of operational art. Although individuals and units used initiative to overcome some shortfalls, the lack of instantaneous command and control capabilities especially during the final TF Ranger operation in Oct 93 led to a tactical defeat with strategic implications. The example of the TF Ranger mission provides a vehicle to view the impact of not having instantaneous command and control at the operational level.

When the seventh raid attempted by TF Ranger went awry, the QRF was prepared to assist with the link-up and extraction of the Rangers and Delta team members. Although TF Ranger and the QRF were able to communicate via radio, the lack of armored vehicles within the QRF dictated Coalition support from Malaysian and Pakistani forces. The absence of standardized communications equipment within the multinational environment resulted in a severely delayed rescue operation. Additionally, TF Ranger was operating under a separate command structure than that of the QRF. This command structure failed to fully integrate the QRF in the planning of TF Ranger missions, thus denying MG Montgomery the ability to anticipate the needs of both TF Ranger and QRF forces. As noted previously, there was only a coordination requirement between the TF Ranger element and MG Montgomery's forces. Without a formal command structure established between the two forces, there was never a functional liaison in place to conduct the required coordination. Normally, a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) would provide the liaison capability for the commander in MG Montgomery's position. This formal relationship through a SOCCE was not formally established until 7 October 1993 with the stand up of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia.³⁷ Unfortunately, the failed TF Ranger mission took place on the 3rd of October.

The overall command and control of UNOSOM II is clearly expressed by authors David Bently and Robert Oakley in their comparison of Somalia and Haiti operations.

“At the outset, UNOSOM II had serious command, control, and communications problems, stemming from inadequate planning, absence of clear doctrine, and inadequate communications and liaison between HQ and component units. There was confusion over the roles of the UN Secretary General, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping, the Secretary General's Special Representative, the Turkish Force Commander, and the U.S. Deputy Commander.”³⁸

The Operationally Durable Formation

Dr. Schneider states that the operationally durable formation is the primary engine of operational design.³⁹ In his essay “Vulcan’s Anvil”, he provides examples of operationally durable military forces in the Civil War, specifically cavalry units conducting independent operations. This provides an example of a military force distributed throughout the depth of the battlefield equipped and supplied to conduct independent operations. The cavalry provided the Army commander with an ability to maximize freedom of action by drawing enemy formations away from other main efforts.⁴⁰ In contemporary terms such forces are structured to affect a balance between an ability to conduct independent actions and battlefield survivability. In Somalia, we see several examples of operationally durable formations.

The UNOSOM II forces under UN command were given a mission under chapter VII of the UN charter that would afford them the opportunity to create conditions for diplomatic and economic efforts to succeed in Somalia. The UN forces were tailored and equipped to meet the needs of the UN while operating within the military or political

capacity of their respective government. The UNLSC provided the means to sustain the multinational UN force. Under UN auspices, additional forces under the U.S. unilateral initiative demonstrated another operationally durable unit.

TF Ranger was another tool provided by the CENTCOM commander to enhance the freedom of action for UN policy makers. TF Ranger focused on the capture and removal of warring clan leaders to establish conditions for security of UN humanitarian efforts as well as removing the catalysts for civil disturbance in the region. TF Ranger was fully equipped with adequate resources to accomplish their mission. Ground forces from the 75th Ranger Regiment, air assets from TF 160, and members of a Special Forces Delta team were combined to provide the capability of independent action. TF Ranger possessed the maneuver assets and firepower to successfully conduct their raids. The failure of the seventh raid was not a question of the durability of the unit, but problems in coordination and assumed risk in conducting the mission in daylight under the same design as the previous six raids.⁴¹

Prior to the official stand up of JTF Somalia under UNOSOM II, the QRF was another example of an operationally durable force. The QRF mission was originally to provide specific support for UNOSOM II and force protection for U.S. forces. This role expanded to one of conducting “those operations beyond the Coalition force’s capabilities.” These missions included: raids, cordon and search, search and clear, aerial attack, and reconnaissance.⁴² The QRF was tailored to meet these missions with personnel and equipment. The QRF evolved from a predominant ground force to a force built around an aviation battalion. This facilitated maneuver and quick response time. In

addition to the normal combat power, the QRF also maintained a Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to enable the sustainment of the force. Although the QRF was not a UNOSOM II subordinate unit it did respond directly to the Commander U.S. Forces, Somalia (COMUSFORSOM) who also happened to be the UNOSOM II deputy commander. Of greatest importance is that the QRF was an operationally tailored unit designed to support UNOSOM II objectives at the operational level.

Operational Vision

Dr. Schneider provides a description of General Ulysses S. Grant as a commander with the ability to grasp the contents of the entire distributed battlefield. This operational vision demonstrated by General Grant is seen as the ability to ensure that all military actions are focused with a common operational vision that is synergistic in nature. Because of the command and control structure it is difficult to identify true U.S. military operational vision in the framework of the UN. The best approach is to view the actions of General Hoar at U.S. CENTCOM for elements of operational vision.

Referring back to figure three, we see that both USFORSOM under MG Montgomery and TF Ranger under MG Garrison were under the command of GEN Hoar at CENTCOM. By the UN command structure, USFORSOM was also subordinate to UNOSOM II commanded by LTG Bir of Turkey. As discussed in the section "distributed campaigns", the overall command and control structure did not facilitate linking separate tactical actions to operational objectives.

In effect, the potential synergy that both special operations forces working in conjunction with conventional military force was lost in the convoluted command structure. TF Ranger operated clearly within the realm of conflict exercising the flexible application of combat power. USFORSOM focused on creating a secure and peaceful environment exercising restraint in its use of combat power to provide security and force protection. Until the stand up of JTF Somalia in October of 1993 there would be no mechanism in place for a U.S. commander to maintain a comprehensive vision of the battlefield to ensure a synergistic effort of tactical actions.

The JTF staff provides a capability for the commander of collecting information, synthesizing and coordinating joint operations. In effect, the synergy of all U.S. military components are directed by the operational vision of one commander.

The Distributed Enemy

The opposing force must be generally symmetrical and arrayed in depth to preclude the opportunity for a single decisive engagement. This definition by Dr. Schneider is perhaps the most difficult facet of UNOSOM II to visualize. The symmetry results from opposing forces being similar in organization, doctrine and equipment. In Somalia, this was clearly not the case with the threat faced by the U.S. military. However, symmetry between the U.S. military and the warring clans was achieved through concepts other than doctrine, equipment and organization.

The warring clans in Somalia were equipped with numerous crew served, small arms, numerous anti-armor weapons and a few tanks.⁴³ Because of the large number of

separate clans in Somalia, their operations were seldom coordinated and remained dispersed based on clan boundaries. Although tactical actions were not formally linked for the clans, the overall objective of ridding Somalia of U.S. and UN military presence was common to many of the clans. The U.S. military, traditionally viewed as a superpower with an asymmetrical advantage and the capability to achieve decisive victory, was not able to exercise its military advantage over the Somali threat. The combined arms capability found in I Marine Expeditionary Force during UNITAF was replaced in UNOSOM II by a light infantry force with fixed and rotary wing assets for firepower and maneuver. The decided equipment advantage for the U.S. military was now questionable. Additionally, further constraints on military forces further leveled the playing field to bring a symmetry to both sides.

The primary factor in limiting the application of firepower available to the U.S. military was the operational rules of engagement (ROE). Although the ROE clearly stated that "Nothing in these ROE limits your right to take all necessary and appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit", limiting collateral damage and civilian casualties was the predominant objective in the published ROE.⁴⁴ The Somalis quickly determined the UN and U.S. military's limits of authority in applying force. The result was the Somali's routine use of women and children as a protective shield from armed retaliation.⁴⁵ The ROE was developed with the intent to foster a secure and peaceful environment not to restrict tactical operations. However, by establishing the ROE, UN and U.S. military commanders were forced to operate without the ability to wield decisive combat power to maintain the asymmetric advantage.

Distributed Deployment

The final element of operational art is the necessity for continuous mobilization to sustain the military effort. The ability of a nation to continuously sustain the military ensures the military force will not be destroyed in a single engagement. The theoretical assumption is the resource and production base of a nation can support a protracted military operation.⁴⁶ Due to the limited nature of peace operations, the theoretical analogy can be viewed as the will of a nation to support a protracted effort with manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military under UNOSOM I and UNITAF effectively accomplished the initial objective of ending the mass starvation in Somalia. These operations appeared limited in scope to the nation. Because of the combat power present in I MEF there were few casualties to American forces. The military power available to UN and U.S. military deterred the warring Somali clans from acting in force against the UN effort.

UNOSOM II increased the scope of operations in Somalia to include rebuilding infrastructure, establishing a government, ect. As the scope increased, the available combat power in theater decreased as the marines redeployed from Somalia. The will of the United States people began to be tested. America was now sending predominantly traditional combat service and combat service support personnel to perform the peace operation. The reduction of combat power available to UN and U.S. military forces prompted the Somali clans to become more aggressive in their actions against the UN effort.

As U.S. casualties mounted, the will of the nation to support UNOSOM II within the realm of "vital national interest" was questioned. Under UNITAF, the U.S. military suffered eight soldiers killed in action (KIA). These casualties were the result of land mines, light military action and traffic accidents.⁴⁷ The will of the U.S. continued to be sufficient to support the operations in Somalia during UNITAF. Once the U.S. and the UN identified Adid as the enemy and began active measures to eliminate the clan leader and his lieutenants the requirement for U.S. will increased. With a concrete target for the military the potential use of force increased. TF Ranger operations, designed specifically to take the fight to Adid and eliminate him as a threat to the UN effort, resulted in greater casualties for both U.S. and Somali civilians.

The failed raid by TF Ranger was actually a success in the military sense. The raid netted two dozen of Adid's lieutenants. Unfortunately, what the American people saw was the seventeen dead and missing from TF Ranger and the sixty wounded American soldiers. The raid also resulted in over 1000 Somali casualties.⁴⁸ The 3 October raid results led to a decision by President Clinton on 7 October to begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. The U.S. will reflected in the decision of the president could no longer support their military forces in Somalia.

Conclusion

The UNOSOM II operation demonstrated some costly shortfalls in American foreign policy. Only ten years earlier the United States suffered the same fate while

conducting peace operations in Lebanon. The U.S. military had been committed to a difficult mission in Somalia. Conducting humanitarian operations in the face of warring militias required the application of restrained force linked closely with efforts to create a peaceful environment. The difficulty experienced by the military leaders in Somali can be brought to light with an analysis of Dr. Schneider's eight elements of operational art. Within the framework established by the elements of operational art it is apparent that strategic shortfalls of the UNOSOM II operation were largely influenced by both strategic and operational decisions.

Distributed Operation

The separate operations by conventional forces, special operations forces, and civilian organizations with the specific aim of "rehabilitating political institutions and the economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation" set forth in the UN Security Council resolution 814 demonstrated the distributed actions in time and space that define the distributed operation in the theoretical definition. The extended LOCs from the U.S. to the ports of Mogadishu provided the depth to the theater of operation that must also be present for the distributed operation.

Distributed Campaign

MG Montgomery and MG Garrison were both attempting to remove the support system of the Somali militia through separate operations. Strict interpretation of the distributed campaign would show these separate operations as falling within the

framework of operational art. These separate operations were not planned and executed by the same higher headquarters. Without proper coordination measures and an appreciation of the impact each operation would have on the other, this distributed campaign proved to be disjointed. The focus of the two operations was similar, however, it was the ineffective command and control link established between the two operations that provided a catalyst for strategic failure.

Continuous Logistics

The ports of Mogadishu provided a large logistical base that continued to sustain the tempo and density of UNOSOM II operations. The UN forces and the QRF maintained separate logistical packages that allowed the continuous sustainment of their independent operations. As identified in the case study, there was little coordination between the separate logistical efforts as well as problems from not establishing a true general support supply base in theater. The problems encountered due to logistic inefficiencies were not insurmountable for the length of the operation. Again, using the theoretical definition, the continuous logistics element was present in UNOSOM II.

Instantaneous Command and Control

The element of instantaneous command and control was present during UNOSOM II however, there were some shortfalls. As discussed earlier, signals communication assets were very effective between U.S. operational elements. The breakdown in command and control occurred when operational requirements for

combined UN efforts exceeded the capability of other UN forces communication assets. This problem was outside the realm of MG Montgomery and even General Hoar to solve. The additional problem in the area of special operations liason was the result of MG Montgomery being given an ad-hoc staff with no formal SOCCE. The fully integrated staff capable of planning for and advising the commander was not present until JTF Somalia arrived in October 1993 to assist in the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Again, this was not a failure of the operational commander, but possibly a shortfall in properly resourcing the operation from the strategic level.

Operationally Durable Formation

UNOSOM II provides three separate examples of operationally durable formations. TF Ranger, the QRF and the UN force as a whole were all tailored to accomplish specific missions. The UN force was tailored based on the ability of participating nations to provide required forces for combat, combat support and combat service support within their national capability. The U.S. led QRF was designed with a peacekeeping capability and associated logistical support outside the realm of the UNLSC. Additionally, TF Ranger was designed with the intent of conducting limited raids with rapid maneuver and precision engagement to limit collateral damage. Although TF Ranger operations eventually led to increased casualties, this was due mainly to an inadequate command and control structure. Within the theater, TF Ranger operations eroded the peaceful environment that General Bir of the UN forces and MG Montgomery were trying to establish.

Operational Vision

The operational vision defined by Dr. Schneider requires a commander with a complete picture of the battlefield. Using General Hoar as the focus for this element, we see that his ability to maintain a common picture was limited by the convoluted command and control structure. The placement of USARFOR under the UN control prevented General Hoar from obtaining the synergistic potential of having conventional and special operations directed with a common aim. As evidenced by the TF Ranger raid mission, the result was diametrically opposed operations to achieve a common objective. It should also be noted that prior to the introduction of special forces for raid purposes, General Hoar advised against the concept.⁴⁹ It appears that the strategic level decision makers prevented the operational commander from effectively linking the tactical actions to strategic goals.

Distributed Enemy

Viewing the Somali militias as a distributed enemy providing symmetry on the battlefield is difficult when considering the capability of the U.S. military. Due to the nature of peace operations, the potential asymmetrical advantage gained through the flexible application of combat power may not be possible. Additionally, in MOOTW, overwhelming combat power may not provide the best solution to the desired strategic end state. ROE for military forces designed to create a stable and peaceful environment combined with distributed militias operating without ROE worked to create a level

playing field where the expected asymmetrical advantage did not exist for UN and U.S. military forces.

Distributed Deployment

The size and capability of the standing U.S. military precludes the requirement for the theoretical industrial and sustainment base in MOOTW. The analogous “will of the people” to support the UNOSOM II operation provides the focus of the distributed deployment. UNOSOM I and UNITAF both enjoyed the support of the American people. The goal of ending the dying through predominant humanitarian efforts was achieved with relatively few casualties. In general, the American people were prepared to continue supporting the humanitarian effort when a majority of the casualties were a result of accidents. Casualties during UNOSOM II rose and the American will ended with scenes of dead U.S. soldiers being drug through the streets of Mogadishu. The end of the distributed operation occurred when the will of the American people, voiced through the president, called for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia in October 1993.

Intended or not, the UNOSOM II operation took place within the theoretical framework of operational art described by Dr. Schneider. Like the principles of war in *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, the eight elements of Dr. Schneider’s operational art are not a prescriptive method to ensure success in operations. They do provide a means to identify shortcomings from a historical perspective. As can be seen from UNOSOM II, operating within the framework does not ensure success in military operations. The

detailed analysis of each element provides the important lessons learned. If Somalia is an example of the future challenges for the U.S. military, then examining MOOTW with respect to the elements of operational art provides a means to identify potential shortfalls in the planning and execution of future MOOTW.

MOOTW, specifically peace operations, occurs within the overlapping bands of combat and non-combat along the spectrum of conflict. Because of the apparent duality of peace operations a commander and staff must be prepared to plan and execute outside of the U.S. military's traditional paradigm of total war. Unity of effort, operational vision and instantaneous command and control enhance the operational commander's ability to direct and influence operations distributed in time and space. In the MOOTW environment the operational commander and staff must retain the flexibility required to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict with an overarching goal of ensuring military operations are directed towards achieving the desired strategic end state.

The operational commander and staff in UNOSOM II did not cause the failure of the overall mission. However, the command structure dictated by policy makers limited the unity of effort, operational vision and command and control of the U.S. military leaders in UNOSOM II. The JTF structure present in UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and at the tail end of UNOSOM II provided the operational commander with the assets and capabilities to fully integrate available means. The JTF organization with a single operational commander can help bridge the gaps when linking tactical actions to strategic objectives through:

- Deconflicting multiple efforts (military tactical and logistical)
- Coordinating between conventional and special operations forces.
- Continuous evaluation of military endstates with political objectives.
- Providing a single point of authority for unity of effort.

From an historical perspective, UNOSOM II appears to be a failure of American foreign policy. The actions of individual soldiers and tactical units did not cause the shortfalls in UNOSOM II. Using Dr. Schneider's analogy of the operational commander practicing operational art on the media of the extended and distributed battlefield we see UNOSOM II as a botched art work.⁵⁰ The U.S. military forces operated within the framework of operational art, however, the operational commander was not resourced with the proper tools from the strategic leadership.

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- ⁵ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1994. I-1.
- ⁶ Dr. David S. Alberts, Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations. (Number 10, October 1994, accessed 6 Jan 1998); from the Internet available from <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z1001.html>; Internet
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- ⁸ Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), [Memorandum on-line] (U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1996, accessed 12 November 1997); available from <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z302.html>; Internet.
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- ¹⁴ Alexander Svechin, Strategy , Foreword by Dr. Jacob Kipp, p 27.
- ¹⁵ Svechin, p 38
- ¹⁶ This synopsis of Tukachevsky comes from class notes taken during lesson 1-24 "Theory of Operational Art II", Seminar 2 with LTC (P) Baggott as the facilitator. Additional information on Tukachevsky and Triandafillov can be found in Richard Simpkin's "Race to the Swift", (Brassey Defense Publishing, London, England.: 1985) Chapter 3, Deep Operation Theory.

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³⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned UNOSOM II. p II-12-3.

³⁵ Ibid, p II-10-5.

³⁶ Ibid, p II-10-1.

³⁷ Ibid, p I-2-1.

³⁸ Bentley, p 2.

³⁹ Schneider, p.58.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 57.

⁴¹ Bolger, p. 314-15.

⁴² Center for Army Lessons Learned UNOSOM II. p I-3-1.

⁴³ Bolger, p.298.

⁴⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned UNOSOM II. p. G-1.

⁴⁵ Bolger, p. 302.

⁴⁶ Schneider, p. 63.

⁴⁷ Bolger, p. 293.

⁴⁸ Bolger, p.325-326. The account of the casualties is further broken down to account for other participating nations. These figures reflect only U.S. casualties during the raid. The Malaysians and Pakistanis also suffered casualties in there rescue attempt. The U.S. and UN estimates of the casualties also appear to be fairly close to each other.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 329. Mr. Bolger states that the trust president Clinton showed in special warfare operations went against advice from General Hoar and others. The reliance on a small tactical force left little room for friction and a thinking enemy.

⁵⁰ Schneider, p. 35.

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Operational Art In Operations Other Than War With Somalia

Topic Outline

Chapter One - Introduction (4-5 pages)

Problem background and significance

U.S. Military forces conduct OOTW more frequently than high intensity conflict.

With OOTW, the tactical actions are very closely linked to the strategic objectives.

Operational Art provides a means to ensure the link between the tactical and strategic level of operations.

Did U.S. forces practice operational art in Somalia to link tactical action to strategic objectives?

Chapter Two- OOTW (6-7 pages)

Operations Other Than War

The Joint definition of OOTW.

MOOTW encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.

U.S. involvement in last three decades.

Our current National Security Strategy discusses at length the possible and intended uses of our military forces. The strategy from our senior leaders clearly identify operations other than war, to include peacekeeping operations as possibly being our most frequent challenge as a military in the future.

The United States is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world .

Define specific OOTW that will be discussed in the monograph

Chapter Three - Operational Art (7-8 pages)

The beginning of operational art according to Dr. Schneider.

Characteristics of operational art. The single unique characteristic is the employment of forces in deep distributed operations.

Civil War campaigns of Grant and Sherman

Soviet development of operational art

Svechin

Tukechevsky

Savkin

Current U.S. theory of operational art
Joint Doctrine

Common ground definition of operational art to be used for analysis

Chapter Four - Case Study (10-12 pages)

Background of U.S. involvement in Somalia

U.N Resolution

OOTW Missions - Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Humanitarian

Elements of Operational Art as they appeared in Somalia

- (1) The Distributed Operation: Military actions comprise an integration of distributed actions extended in time and space but unified by a common aim to retain or deny freedom of action.
- (2) The Distributed Campaign: Military actions focus not on a single objective but instead on several objectives within an opposing military system and ultimately achieve victory by causing the collapse of system support.
- (3) Continuous Logistics: Logistical support is derived from a formal system that provides continuous support of military actions instead of from a dependence on scavenging.
- (4) Instantaneous Command and Control: The command and control structure is linked together with a reliable system that allows for rapid communication.
- (5) The Operationally Durable Formation: Military forces are structured with an effective balance between independence of action and battlefield survivability.
- (6) Operational Vision: Military actions are focused with a common operational vision that is synergistic in nature.
- (7) The Distributed Enemy: The opposing force must be generally symmetrical and arrayed in depth to preclude the opportunity for a single decisive engagement.
- (8) Distributed Deployment: Military actions must be supported by continuous mobilization.

Chapter Five - Analysis (4-5 pages)

According to Dr. Schneider's characteristics of operational art...

Chapter Six - Conclusions (3-4 pages)